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ABSTRACT 
BRADY, GORDON LEONARD Jr.    A Survey of Protectionism from Import Quotas. 
(1973)    Directed by:    Dr.  Paul  G. Althaus. 
It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the contributions to 
the theory of protectionism from import quotas and to compare quota 
protection with tariff protection.    Partial  and general equilibrium 
analysis are used to compare the effects of quotas on consumption, 
production, and income distribution with tariffs and free trade. 
Edgeworth boxes are used to determine the effects of quotas on trade in 
a pure exchange model. 
Tariffs and quotas are found  'equivalent'   in the static context 
of both partial  and general equilibrium analysis.    By 'equivalent' we 
mean both can be used to produce identical  results with respect to 
prices, production, consumption and income distribution.    The  'equivalence' 
breaks down in the dynamic context due to the different adjustment 
mechanisms of the two systems.    Quotas are shown to adjust to shifting 
markets through changes in relative prices while adjustment under the 
tariff takes place through changes in the quantities traded.    In the 
dynamic partial  equilibrium model we find the quota more protective than 
the tariff in the  'tightening'  market and less protective in the 
•softening' market.    Our findings in the  'tightening' market contradict 
the historical  reliance on tariffs in markets with inelastic demand.    In 
the  'softening'  market context the use of tariffs is found valid. 
In the dynamic general  equilibrium model we demonstrate the 
importance of initial  endowments in determining the willingness to trade 
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CHAPTER I 
THE  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the protection 
afforded by tariffs and import quotas.    Using partial  and general 
equilibrium analysis in static and dynamic contexts, we will  compare 
and contrast the two means of protection.    The quota concept will  be 
introduced by sketching the historical context in which it was first 
used with tariffs introduced as alternative means of protection.    The 
effect of protection on prices, consumption, and trade will be given 
and related to the concepts of social cost and social benefit, transfers 
of consumer's and producer's surplus, and revenue effects or 'quota 
profits'.    The social cost-benefit approach provides the analytical  tools 
with which to clarify and contrast the operational characteristics of the 
two systems.    The  'static equivalence'  of tariffs and quotas will  be 
demonstrated and the break-down of 'equivalence'  under dynamic conditions 
will be shown.    Dynamic analysis of three market conditions will  be used 
to show the differences in adjustment to shifting market conditions.    We 
begin with a historical sketch of the conditions in which quotas were 
first used and why tariffs were considered risky. 
Section One:    The Situation Surrounding the Introduction of 
Import Quotas into France 
According to Kindleberger,1 the French were the first to use 
import quotas.    In the face of an inelastic supply of Australian wheat 
hi ndleberger, C.  P.,  International Economics, Homewood,  Illinois: 
Richard D.  Irwin,  Inc., 1963, pp.  130-134. 
in 1930,  the French were not sure that a tariff rate could be devised which 
would allow some Australian wheat to be imported, yet prevent a drastic 
decline in domestic wheat prices resulting from an oversupply situation. 
A decrease in domestic wheat prices, they felt, would threaten the 
political  stability of their country by forcing the peasants off the 
farm.    Because the French felt it politically desirable to have a peasant 
class, they decided a new course of action was necessary.    Their goal was 
to allow enough wheat importation to maintain trade relations with the 
Australians, but not so much that domestic wheat prices would decrease 
the standard of living of the peasants, and possibly force them out of 
the agricultural sector.    With this in mind, the government determined 
that price stability could best be accomplished by setting an absolute 
quantitative limitation on the imports of Australian wheat.    The 
importation of wheat was then limited to a quantity which they felt 
was  low enough to maintain a level of domestic wheat prices high enough 
to sustain the peasants.    Now let us see how present-day protectionists 
rationalize the use of quotas in the United States. 
Section Two:    The Use of Import Quotas in the United States 
The history of United States'  quotas goes back to the Long-term 
Cotton Arrangement set up under President Kennedy, and the voluntary 
steel quotas of the Johnson Administration.   The rationale for protection 
has been varied.    Textile quota supporters maintain this type of protection 
is essential  for a basic industry employing a type of non-competitive 
worker not readily absorbed elsewhere in the economy.    The supporters of 
protection for the steel  industry justify quotas because steel  is a 
capital-intensive industry that is often faced with surges of imports, as 
foreign producers attempt to substitute export sales for domestic sales 
during times of slack demand in their own economies.    The steel  industry 
maintains that due to its capital-intensive nature it is unable to compete 
by cutting prices or production without seriously impairing its financial 
health.     Presenting still  another side is the justification of petroleum 
import quotas on the basis of national security.    The petroleum industry 
advocates limiting imports of foreign crude in order to maintain high 
domestic prices, which they say is necessary to encourage domestic 
exploration.    Unique capital- and labor-intensive situations and national 
security are representative of the justifications used by producers.    In 
the past quotas have been used to place absolute limitations on the  'flood' 
of cheaper foreign products.    When faced with a foreign supply which is 
completely unresponsive to price changes, quotas may be the only viable 
solution. 
Until  recently, quotas could be characterized as unilateral and 
permanent.    Unilateral, in that negotiations were not held to make the 
terms agreeable to both sides; and permanent, as they were indefinite 
with respect to time and made no provision for re-evaluation.    There is 
a trend toward negotiating a type of bilateral quota called  'temporary 
voluntary agreements'.    Although these are, in effect, agreements not to 
compete or to restrict competition in certain areas, they have been 
justified as a means of heading off protectionist sentiment by providing 
adjustment time and in some cases government incentives for threatened 
industries.    Quotas enable the response to be short term rather than 
long term.    Supporters maintain quotas can be used more effectively in 
restricting imports and with less long-run distortion of resource 
allocation because the psychological  impact of changing the quantity of 
imports differs from that of changing the rate of divergence between 
foreign and domestic prices.    In most cases,  'temporary voluntary 
agreements'  are tied to commitments to shrink ailing domestic industries 
in exchange for agreements from foreign countries to temporarily moderate 
the growth of some exports.    The time gained may be used to sort out 
potentially profitable companies in the industry that might receive 
tax credits, while those with no discernible prospects might receive 
job training for their employees, or other types of adjustment assistance. 
Depending on the circumstances, incentives in the form of accelerated 
depreciation, technical assistance, or possible exemption from anti- 
trust action might also be used.    Although it has been estimated that 
permanent quotas cost from ten to fifteen billion dollars for items on 
the consumer price index, proponents maintain this type of temporary 
protection has lower social cost than permanent protection.      The quota 
should be removed and competition reinstated when the  'threatened- 
industry has had time to adjust, even if it is not off the  'critical' 
list. 
While a justification for tariffs has been the protection of 'infant' 
industries, the use of quotas marks the extension of protection from 
•infant'  to  'mature'  industries.    The use of the term 'mature'  requires 
some explanation.    We make the distinction between  'infant'   and  'mature' 
industries in terms of the degree of stability present in the production 
2Beman, Lewis, "How To Tell Where We're Competitive,"  Fortune. 
Vol.   LXXXVI, No.   1, July 1972, p.   54. 
process.    A 'mature'   industry may be described as having stabilized in 
terms of growth, expanding at a rate near that of the economy, and able 
to achieve economies of scale.    On the other hand, an  'infant'  industry 
is in the process of expanding at a rate greater or less than the rate 
of growth of the economy and is unable to achieve economies of scale. 
Historically, tariffs have been used to protect  'infant'  industries by 
raising the foreign price equal  to or higher than the domestic price. 
This is meant to encourage expansion to optimum size and production at 
the least cost combination of inputs in order to permit competition between 
domestic and foreign producers.    It may also provide the stimulation for 
a potential monopoly to become a monopoly.    When an  'infant'   industry 
becomes a  'mature'  industry, the justification for tariffs is no longer 
valid, and should also be removed.    Quotas, on the other hand, control 
access to domestic markets in order to provide adjustment time for 
'mature'   industries threatened by foreign competition and prevent imports 
from taking over the domestic market.    Aside from protecting  'Infant'  or 
'mature'  industries, tariffs and quotas may have other uses. 
Tariff and quota protection may also be used to maintain the 
status quo, correct balance of payments or other such disequilibria, or 
as a bargaining tool against similar regulations by other countries. 
Quotas provide absolute limitation of imports in markets in which foreign 
supply is unresponsive to changes in price resulting from the imposition 
of tariffs.    Quotas are superior to tariffs in such markets because the 
effect of tariffs is less certain due to the effect of the elasticities 
of demand and supply on price changes.    Recent quotas have been used as 
a  'stop-gap'  measure, while the use of tariffs has tended to entail  long- 
term objectives, such as the development of an industry.    Short-run tariffs 
might conceivably be used to accomplish the same objectives.    Although 
based on the most scientifically verified observations of inelastic 
foreign supply, the use of quotas introduces a more arbitrary dimension 
into international  trade than tariffs. 
Section Three:    Quotas Are More Arbitrary 
We know protection in any form opposes the forces which cause 
countries to trade, and prevents production and consumption according to 
the  'comparative advantage'  of a country.    The introduction of protection 
alters trading patterns by causing variations in the set of relative 
prices facing producers and consumers for reasons other than transportation 
cost differentials.    The administrators of quota systems are granted a 
3 
greater degree of explicit arbitrariness than tariff administrators. 
While it is true that a tariff rate may be set arbitrarily, the adminis- 
trators of a tariff system are unable to determine the final  outcome of 
their actions in terms of a specified import level and individual 
importers as under a quota.    With a quota, the free market determination 
of prices as a rationing device is replaced by the decisions of bureaucrats 
sometimes guided by considerations other than efficiency and maximization. 
The outcome of a tariff may be described as distorting, but not replacing 
the market mechanism.    A quota allows administrators to evaluate fairness, 
equity and justice,  in arriving at a decision as to what is to be imported 
and by whom, as well  as the prices and quantities at which the transactions 
are to take place.    The administrative flexibility inherent to the use of 
3Kindleberger, C.  P.,  International  Economics, Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D.   Irwin, Inc.,  1963, p.  131. 
quotas may encourage unsystematic change and price volatility at the 
expense of the consumer.    The point we wish to emphasize is that quotas 
permit the administrator to be more arbitrary, and more considerate of 
'special'  interests, though not necessarily 'vested'  interests, than 
tariffs, due to their ability to determine a priori  the quantity as well 
as the importers, and those who may reap the increase in import values 
resulting from the restriction of trade.    The operational  characteristics 
of quotas need not produce greater movement from free trade equilibria 
than tariffs, but when coupled with political motivations of 'special' 
and  'vested'  interests, the resulting trade diversion may have significant 
social cost. 
Section Four:    The Distortions Caused by Commercial  Policy 
By social  cost we mean the loss of production in non-protected 
industries resulting from resource shifts to protected industries, and 
the decrease in consumption resulting from protection-induced price 
increases.    Under perfect competition, price equals the marginal  social 
value of the commodity.    Under protection, price may not be reflective of 
social value.    The equilibrium price may be greater or less than the 
marginal  social  value.    Ultimately, protection may lead to artificial 
stimulation and channeling of resources Into non-optimal uses.    By non- 
optimal we mean resource shifts away from areas of greatest social 
benefit. 
Natural  gas is an example of the misallocation of resources resulting 
from commercial  policy.    Because the rate structure of electric utilities 
is based on generating capacity, the expansion of facilities has been 
8 
encouraged to the point where it is feasible from a cost standpoint to 
generate electricity by burning natural gas.    Some of this electricity 
is then put to uses competitive with natural gas.    This paradox has 
resulted from domestic policy aimed at holding the price of natural  gas 
artificially low in order to stimulate its consumption.    The low price of 
natural  gas encouraged excessive demand and tended to exclude more 
expensive foreign gas, while at the same time discouraging domestic 
development of natural gas resources.    The rate structure of the electric 
utilities is equally blame-worthy, as it has in many cases encouraged the 
unwarranted expansion of utilities in order to lower their unit cost, but, 
at the same time, maintained or increased their price per kilowatt hour. 
Commercial  policy may stimulate or retard the growth of an industry.    In 
this case, commercial policy encouraged the expansion of the electric 
utilities, which created excess demand in the natural  gas industry. 
Natural  gas producers were at the same time discouraged from developing 
domestic sources due to price regulation. 
Having provided an example of the distortions caused by commercial 
policy,  let us proceed to develop graphically the analysis of tariffs and 
quotas.     In Section Five we will begin by using the definition of a tariff 
to develop the social  cost-benefit analysis and the concepts of consumer's 
and producer's surplus. 
4 
Section Five:    Social  Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Concept of Surplus 
A tariff is a tax, and in many respects, a quota has the same 
effect as a tax.    In Figure 1   (page 9) the effect of a tax on a single 
4See Vickrey, William S., Microstatics, New York:    Harcourt, Brace, 
and World,  Inc.,  1964, p.  262. 
9 
product with a rising supply curve is demonstrated.    It is necessary to 
describe the model  and define the concepts of social cost and social 
benefit before proceeding with the tax analysis.    Under perfect competition, 
Figure 1:    Social Surplus 
the supply curve HCAS corresponds to the marginal social  cost curve which 
is obtained by summing horizontally the marginal  cost curves of competing 
producers.    Social  cost may be defined in two ways.    First, social cost 
is the resource sacrifice in terms of one commodity in a two-commodity 
world, which consumers are willing to undergo in order to obtain an 
additional  unit of the other commodity.    Secondly, it may be defined as 
10 
the amount of money required to compensate individuals adversely affected 
by a given step.     For example, restricting production to a certain level 
gives rise to gainers and losers which become policy considerations.    Because 
social  cost is the supply curve under perfect competition,  it will  be 
affected by fluctuations in the price of inputs.    Taxes have the same effect 
as an increase in factor prices and may be shown by an upward shift of the 
supply curve by the amount of the tax.    The demand curve GBAD represents 
the marginal  social value or marginal  social  benefit derived from the 
consumption of an additional unit of the commodity.    Under perfect 
competition the price consumers are willing to pay for an additional unit 
represents the benefit they receive.    The market price of a factor is 
determined by the intersection of the marginal  social cost and marginal 
social  benefit curves.    Because under perfect competition the supply curve 
is the marginal social  cost curve, and demand equals marginal  social benefit, 
the equilibrium price level  reflects the value society places on the con- 
sumption and production of the good and will  lead to an efficient allocation 
of resources.    We will  now relate the social  cost-benefit analysis to the 
concepts of consumer's and producer's surplus. 
Consumer's surplus is defined by Marshall  as the money value of 
marginal  utility above what the consumer would have been willing to pay 
rather than go without the commodity.    Hicks defines it as the compensation 
which would have to be paid consumers if they were prevented from spending 
their money in a certain way, and yet were to be enabled to make themselves 
as well  off as before.5    Producer's surplus is the Marshallian counterpart 
Review 
5Hicks, John R.,   'The Rehabilitation of Consumer's Surplus', 
of Economics Studies, February 1941, Vol.  8, p.  111. 
11 
representing the economic rent attributable to the excess of productivity 
in the next best alternative use.    Hicks defines it as the compensation 
which would have to be paid to factor owners used in an industry, if they 
were to be denied opportunity to produce in this industry, and though 
compelled to transfer themselves to other less advantageous occupations, 
were yet to be as well off as before.6    In Figure 1, the initial equilibrium 
is located at point A with production OQ and price QA.    GBAKE represents 
the consumer's surplus, while HAE is its counterpart, producer's surplus. 
AHG, the total  net social  surplus, is the sum of consumer's and producer's 
surplus and represents the benefit received by society due to the existence 
of this industry with production at level OQ, as compared with their 
economic status if production was restricted or prohibited.    The total 
net social  surplus remains unchanged until equilibrium is disturbed by 
shifts  in demand or supply.    In the absence of shifting, no matter how 
much prices may change, the absolute value of the social  surplus will 
remain constant. 
In the tax analysis we may assume the tax is paid either by the 
producer or consumer.    If the producer pays the tax, the supply curve is 
shifted backward or upward, indicating a decrease in the quantity supplied 
at each price level.    Tax BC has the same effect as an addition to 
production costs and is indicated by the new supply curve MBS'.    Given 
a constant demand function, a production tax will  increase the equilibrium 
price level  and decrease production.    In effect, the tax discourages the 
producer and leads to a reduction in supply.    The subsequent scarcity 
3Ibid. p.  111. 
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causes consumers to offer higher prices and is shown by a movement along 
the demand curve.    The reduction in quantity demanded drives out the less 
efficient producers and leaves the survivors to supply the remaining out- 
put at a somewhat lower price.    Production will  decrease until  the price 
offered by consumers has so risen, and the commodity price needed by 
producers to cover their factor costs has so fallen that the margin 
between the higher price paid by consumers and the lower price received 
by producers  is sufficient to cover the tax.    The new equilibrium is 
located at output OR and price RB, which includes the tax. 
Assuming the tax is paid by consumers is another approach to 
the tax analysis.    In this case, the demand curve is lowered, or shifted 
down, by the amount of the tax.    A new demand curve ICD'  is generated, 
intersecting the supply curve at point C with equilibrium production 
level  OR and price net of the tax RC.    Total tax revenue is represented 
by rectangle BCJF.    The increase in price BC resulting from the 
imposition of the tax reduces consumer's surplus to BFG.    Because the 
tax has effectively decreased the net price of their product from OE to 
OJ, the producer's surplus is reduced to HJC. 
The net effect of the tax is to reduce the social surplus by area 
ABC to HCI.    The loss of social  surplus resulting from a tax varies 
according to the elasticity of supply and demand.    A tax would cause 
no loss of social  surplus with an infinitely inelastic demand schedule 
because in this case the social surplus is infinite.    Cigarettes and salt 
are examples of products for which the demand is apparently inelastic 
because the increased price resulting from heavy taxing does not strongly 
affect the level  of consumption. 
13 
The same effects with respect to production and consumption can be 
achieved by imposing a quota restricting the producer's output to OR. 
Assuming the restriction does not initially affect demand, the equilibrium 
price changes from QA to RB.    Restricting production to OR in effect 
reduces the supply curve to point B.    Total  net social  surplus is reduced 
by area ABC as in the tariff case.    The changes in domestic production 
caused by quotas in a two-commodity world may, in general, be assumed to 
have the same effect upon prices as equal  changes in production brought 
about by a tariff.    For this reason, we say they are 'equivalent'  in a 
static partial  equilibrium context.    We must point out, however, that 
although  'equivalent'   in terms of equilibria, they do not operate in the 
same way.     In this respect a quota is the converse of a tariff.    A tariff 
generates the import level  by setting the rate of divergence between 
domestic and foreign prices, while a quota determines the level of 
imports a priori  and allows the rate of divergence to be determined by 
the market.    The limited value of comparative static analysis is demon- 
strated here because we are unable to point to any real  static differences. 
Let us proceed with other types of analyses, which provide a better 
understanding of the fundamental  differences between the two systems. 
Conclusion: Chapter One 
In Chapter One we have seen how import quotas were introduced in 
France to divert the inelastic supply of Australian wheat.    We have also 
shown how recent United States'  import quotas have been used as a  'stop- 
gap' measure to protect domestic industries threatened by foreign 
competition.    The qualities inherent to the administration of import 
' 
14 
quotas have made this type of protection the one preferred by the steel, 
textile, and petroleum industries.    Import quotas are more arbitrary 
because administrators are able to determine a priori the quantities to 
be imported as well as those who will be allowed to import.    Ultimately, 
protection may lead to artificial  stimulation and channeling of resources 
into non-optimal  uses because price may not be reflective of social value. 
We have shown that taxes and quantitative restrictions may be used to 
achieve the same results, since both ultimately limit the supply.    It is 
clear that protection in any form causes a distortion between social cost 
and social  benefit and leads to a reduction in the social  surplus. 
15 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE NON-EQUIVALENCE OF TARIFFS AND QUOTAS  IN A DYNAMIC CONTEXT 
Introduction 
A dispute has developed between Bhagwati, Shibata, Kreinin, and 
Walter over the definition of 'equivalence'  used by Kindleberger to 
describe quota and tariff protection.    Kindleberger maintains that quotas 
generating the same domestic price divergence and import level  are 
'equivalent'  to tariffs with respect to the protective,  consumption, 
redistribution, and revenue effects if we are able to determine to whom 
the 'quota profits'  will accrue.      Bhagwati  defines  'equivalence'  to 
mean the tariff rate will produce an identical discrepancy between foreign 
p 
and domestic prices.      Shibata concentrates on a comparison between the 
domestic prices prevailing under tariffs and quotas.      They conclude 
the two yield  'equivalent'  effects in competitive markets, while the 
'equivalence'  breaks down with the introduction of monopoly. 
Kreinin and Walter maintain the definition of 'equivalence'  is 
misleading and results from the preoccupation of partial  equilibrium 
7Kindleberger, C.  P.,  International  Economics, Homewood,  Illinois: 
Richard D.  Irwin, 1968,  Fourth Edition, pp.   I3U-34 and appendix E. 
8Bhagwati, J., "On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas," in 
R.  E.  Baldwin et al., Trade Growth and the Balance of Payments - Essays 
in Honor of G.  Haberler, Chicago:    Rand McNally & Co.,   I9bb, pp.  53-67; 
and "More on the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas," in American Economic 
Review, March,  1968, pp.   142-46. 
9Shibata, H.,  "A Note on the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas," 
in American Economic Review, March, 1968, pp.  137-42. 
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10 analysis with static phenomena.        They believe the comparison is more 
meaningful  if placed in the context of market reactions to shifts  in 
demand and supply under the tariff and quota system.        We will  pursue 
the dynamic analysis introduced by Kreinin and Walter, and begin by 
demonstrating the 'static-equivalence'  of tariffs and quotas. 
Section One:    'Static Equivalence' 
As previously stated, taxes and quantitative restrictions may 
have identical effects on prices, production, and consumption.    Figure 2 
P 
Figure 2:     'Static Equivalence' Tariffs and Quotas 
10Kreinin, M.,  "More on the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas," 
Kvklos, Vol. 23, 1970, pp.  75-78. 
^Walter,  Ingo, "On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas," Kyklos, 
1971, Vol.  24, pp.  111-13. 
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is used to tie in the effects of 'static equivalent'  tariffs and quotas 
with the concepts of social  cost and social  benefit.    The free trade 
price level  is OP, with domestic production OQ   and imports of Q.Q*. 
The imposition of tariff 0P?/0P, raises the price level  to 0P? and 
brings about an increase in domestic production to 00,  and a decrease 
in imports to Q,Q3 = EF.    The total  decrease in imports Q Q.  less 
Q,Q- may be broken down into components.    Q Q,  is the quantity of 
imports displaced by increased domestic production resulting from 
the increased price level.    Q3Q4 is the quantity of imports displaced 
by the decrease in domestic consumption resulting from the price 
increase.    An import quota of Q,Q3 may be used to generate identical 
effects on production, consumption, prices, and imports as tariff 
0P?/0P,.    Because the same effects are achievable under both systems, 
we may say that quota EF is the 'static equivalent'  of tariff 
0P?/0P,.
12    Having demonstrated  'static equivalence', let us discuss 
the effects of tariffs and quotas on trade in more detail for use in 
the dynamic analysis. 
Section Two:    The Effects of Tariffs and Quotas on Trade 
Area A, the protective effect, represents the money value of 
the increase in domestic production Q0Q1  resulting from the increased 
12Kindleberger,  International  Economics, p.  130. 
13Ibid.  pp.  105-13, 130-132. 
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price level  P,P2.     It refers only to production and represents the 
increase in production resulting from marginal  producers entering the 
market due to the protection-induced increase in domestic price. 
The size of the protective effect varies directly with price and 
is dependent upon the elasticity of domestic supply.    The greater 
the elasticity of supply, the larger the social benefit, and, 
conversely, the more inelastic the supply, the less society has to 
gain from protection.    Since the protective effect represents the 
value of increased production made available to society,  it may be 
called the social  benefit.    By designating the increase in 
production as the  'social  benefit', we make no judgment as to the 
desirability of such increase, and use the term only in reference 
to what society 'gets'  as a result of protection.    For a price 
decrease, the protective effect becomes the social cost of 
protection because it represents the loss of production experienced by 
society due to the decrease in price.    Although in static analysis 
these may seem irrelevant, they become useful  tools of comparison 
in the dynamic analysis. 
The consumption effect, area B,  is the value of the 
consumption lost due to the price increase and is the counterpart 
of the protective effect.    Just as the protective effect represents 
the marginal  producers entering the market due to increased prices, 
the consumption effect represents the marginal consumers leaving 
the market.    The size of the consumption effect is dependent upon 
the elasticity of demand and will  be larger the greater the elasticity 
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of demand, and smaller the more inelastic the demand.    Since it 
represents the loss of consumption of the protected item associated 
with an increase in price,  it may be termed the social  cost.    We 
may describe the consumption effect as the price paid by consumers 
for the benefit received by producers.    The increase in production 
comes at the expense of domestic consumers and foreign suppliers. 
Because    it varies inversely with prices, the consumption effect is 
always negative for the Increase in domestic prices associated 
with protection.    For a price decrease the consumption effect is 
positive and becomes the social  benefit.    Again we make no judgment 
as to the desirability of such changes in consumption. 
The protective and consumption effects constitute the 
'dead weight1  loss of import restrictions because these are not 
compensated by changes in other areas.    While the protective 
effect may be favorable for an industry or region dominated by a single 
economic activity, it will  not benefit the country as a whole.    A 
region within an economic unit selling its product in unprotected 
markets may be adversely affected by not being able to pay the 
relatively higher prices of the protected item. 
The redistribution effect, area C, represents the money value 
of the transfer of consumer's surplus to producer's surplus 
resulting from an increase in prices.    For a price decrease it 
represents a transfer in the opposite direction and will  become 
useful  as a distinguishing characteristic of the quota in the dynamic 
I 
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analysis.    More specifically, it is the economic rent accruing to 
existing producers due to the elimination or restriction of foreign 
competition.    Although protection is argued in terms of the marginal 
producer, it is, in fact, the existing producer who gains because 
under free trade the intensive marginal  producer will not be driven 
out of business, but will make less  'rent'  or profit.    Although the 
income redistributions resulting from protection are important 
policy considerations, we will not be concerned with them in this 
paper.    The redistribution effect is the last static similarity. 
The basic difference between  'static equivalent'  tariffs 
and quotas  lies in who collects the increased value of the 
imports resulting from the protection-induced divergence between 
domestic and foreign price.    Under a tariff, it automatically 
accrues to the government in the form of tariff revenue and is 
called the revenue effect (area D in Figure 2).    In our analysis 
we will  assume tariff revenue is distributed in the form of a 
lump-sum subsidy.    Dispensing the value of commodities collected 
as import duty in this way prevents distortions on the demand 
side.    Without such a distribution system the analysis would be 
diverted from the central  issue of the paper.    To prevent this 
diversion, in the tradition of Marshall, we assume away the 
possibility of its happening.    In the quota case, the value of 
this price divergence is called the  'quota profits'.    This will 
not automatically accrue to the government unless the import 
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rights are sold.    Because the possibility of a price decrease 
is realized in subsequent analysis, we will define the decreased 
value of imports under the quota as the 'quota loss'. 
'Quota profits'  represents the increase in value of 
imports resulting from quota protection.    It exists only at the 
time the quota is  imposed or changed, thus making the method of 
allocating import rights a matter of great significance to 
importers and the general  public as well.    Only the initial 
possessor of the import rights will  reap the windfall or 'quota 
profit'  because this is later capitalized as ownership is 
transferred.    Subsequent owners of the quota rights receive only 
profits normal  to that industry with no economic  'rent'  or  'quota 
profit'   resulting from mere possession.    Generally, the quota is 
divided among importers according to the market share each held 
prior to the introduction of the quota.    Governments may attempt 
to capture the  'quota profits'  by auctioning import licenses or 
permits.    This method is unpopular with officials because it makes 
the extra cost conspicuous and may reduce their power.    A lack of 
objectivity of those administering the program may become apparent 
in the choice of base periods for quota allocation and the weights 
allowed for growth.     It is obvious that wealthier interests in an 
industry have an advantage due to their ability to make administrators 
aware of their views by channeling part of the  'quota profits'  into 
lobbying.    Compared to the tariff, the quota system is more prone 
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toward intense lobbying because importers as well as producers 
stand to gain.    Importers have nothing to gain from tariffs because 
the increased value of the imports automatically accrues to the 
government.    In fact, the importer may lose revenue due to the 
reduced volume of imports.    Producers stand to gain from the price 
increase in either system and would, in most cases, be indifferent 
between tariffs and quotas, unless they thought the windfall would 
accrue to them.    Importers would,  in most cases, prefer the quota 
over the tariff due to the possibility that the  'quota profits' 
might accrue to them.    Disregarding market power, the producer 
never loses from protection, while the importer might lose.    Thus, 
without knowing to whom the  'quota profits'  will  accrue, we expect 
the producer to be indifferent between the means of protection, 
while the importer will always prefer quotas.    In this paper we 
will  not be concerned with the group to which the  'quota profits' 
accrue and mention this only as a factor distinguishing the two 
systems.    Having discussed the static similarities and differences 
of the two systems,  in the next section we use the dynamic analysis 
to bring out the fundamental  differences between the two systems. 
Section Three:    Dynamic Analysis 
Two market structures will be analyzed statically and dynamically 
with the objective of exposing the differing effects on prices, production, 
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consumption, and imports under tariffs and import quotas.     'Tightening' 
and  'softening' markets will  be compared in the following two market 
structures:* 
Case I:      Elastic Demand and Supply 
Case II:    Infinitely Inelastic Demand and Elastic Supply 
These two cases have been chosen to demonstrate the distinctive adjustment 
mechanisms of the two systems to changing market conditions.    Admittedly, 
these represent only a fraction of the myriad possible market conditions 
which might be faced by those making the decision between tariff and 
quota protection, or no protection at all.    We exclude cases which are 
obviously inapplicable, or at best represent unrealistic situations. 
For instance, almost perfectly elastic domestic demand (Sd)  is excluded 
because this is not the type of market in which protection is normally 
used.    Although perfect elasticity is conceivable for some price ranges, 
it is unrealistic for the entire demand curve to display this.     In 
addition, we obtain the same direction of price and quantity changes 
from a demand function which is less than perfectly elastic.    Differences 
occur only with respect to the extent of changes.    Although severely 
restricted, we feel  the cases demonstrate adequately the effect of 
varying degrees of responsiveness on the adjustment process to price 
changes. 
In the exporting country we will  assume elastic demand (Df) and 
inelastic supply (Sf), although the foreign market could also conceivably 
5? i^TcE !T,iW&«^ °f Pr0teCt,°n can be adequately demonstrated with the two cases. 
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take any number of variations.    A foreign supply totally unresponsive 
to price changes has been the condition under which quotas have been 
historically justified.    Tariffs have been used in the opposite market 
situation of perfectly elastic foreign supply.    The use of perfectly 
inelastic foreign supply in our model  does not bias the analysis toward 
quotas because it is possible to monitor the adjustment process under 
perfectly elastic foreign supply by simply reading the quantity imported 
from the horizontal axis.    This approach allows us to compare tariff 
and quota protection in the markets in which they have been considered 
superior.    Inelastic domestic demand, the domestic market structure in 
which tariffs have been historically justified, is analyzed in Case II. 
The severe restrictions placed on the export market structure is in 
keeping with our objective of determining the validity of the 
historical reliance on tariffs and quotas in specific markets as well 
as observing the effects of protection on the exporting country. 
The effects of tariffs and quotas will  be compared in  'tightening' 
and  'softening'  markets.    A 'tightening' market is characterized by an 
increasing price level.    A rising price level may result from increased 
demand (with constant supply) and/or decreased supply (with constant 
demand).    In a  'softening' market, a decreasing price level  results 
from decreasing demand (with constant supply) and/or increasing supply 
(with constant demand).    In each case we will  shift both supply and 
demand in order to obtain a clearer picture of the adjustment process 
under both systems.    In the dynamic comparison a two-country closed 
model of international trade will  be used.    It is closed in the sense 
that imports of the country on the left must equal  the exports of the 
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country on the right.    Trade results from differing production functions 
and tastes, and is explained in our model  by the presence of excess 
demand in the importing country and excess supply in the exporting 
country.    The importing country is characterized by a free trade price 
level  less than the equilibrium price level which would exist 1n the 
absence of trade.    Excess demand at the free trade price level  is also 
present.    In the absence of trade the equilibrium price level in the 
importing country must be greater than the price level  plus transportation 
costs in the exporting country, otherwise there would be no advantage 
for either country to trade.    In the exporting country excess supply is 
present at the free trade price level which is greater than the 
equilibrium price level  in the absence of trade.    Free trade leads to 
increased prices in the exporting country and decreased prices in the 
importing country with trade ceasing when foreign prices plus trans- 
portation costs are equal  to the domestic price.    Having described the 
dynamic market conditions to be investigated,  let us begin with the 
simplest market structure. 
Case I:    Elastic Supply and Demand 
The two-country model with elastic supply and demand is the 
simplest model, and is used to expand the previous discussion, and to 
provide additional criteria for the analysis.    We assume domestic 
supply and demand to be mirror-images to permit price-induced changes 
in production and consumption to have equal absolute value.    Although 
in reality we do not expect supply and demand functions to have identical 
slopes and result in changes of equal absolute value, this is analytically 
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neater and provides an adequate representation of price and quantity 
movements. 
A.     'Tightening'  Market 
In Figure 3, the free trade level of prices is P, with domestic 
production OQ .    The level of domestic consumption 00.  is the sum of 
Q Q   Q   Q   a„ Q, Qn 5    4      3     2    10 
Figure 3:     'Tightening' Market Resulting from Increased Demand 
domestic production 0QQ and imports QQQ4.    Tariff OP2/OP]  and static 
equivalent quota B'C  cause an increase 1n price to P2 with concomitant 
expansion of production to OQ, and contraction of to 0Q3-    Imports 
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decrease to Q3Q, or quota B'C.    Under the assumption of mirror-image 
demand and supply the protective and consumption effects are of equal 
absolute value.     For a price increase the social benefit is the 
protective effect C'CK with the social  cost or consumption effect 
B'GB.    Because the tariff or quota results in a price increase, the 
redistribution effect C'P2P,C is a direct transfer of consumer's surplus 
to producer's surplus and indicates the increased  'rents'  accruing to 
existing producers.    The revenue effect of the tariff or  'quota profits' 
is represented by area B'C'KG.    Since the absolute value of the social 
cost and social benefit is equal, they cancel and the net effect is a 
price increase,  decrease in imports, and an increase in producer's 
surplus or  'rents'  accruing to existing producers.    Having set up the 
static model, let us proceed to a dynamic analysis of the effects of 
shifting market structure after the imposition of protection. 
(1)     'Tightening'  Market Resulting from Increased Demand 
In  (1) we assume domestic demand increases or shifts upward by 
the level  of imports under the  'static equivalent' quota or tariff. 
The shift in demand is set equal  to the import level  in order to 
prevent the clutter resulting from numerous quantity identifications 
on the horizontal  axis.    The equilibria generated under tariffs and 
quotas in shifting markets demonstrates the dynamic non-equivalence of 
the two systems. 
Under tariff 0P2/0P1 the level of domestic consumption increases 
by the full amount of the shift in demand to 0Q5. By holding the price 
constant the tariff allows the shift in demand to become effective with 
no change in the domestic production level.    The difference between 
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domestic production and demand will be referred to as the 'gap1.    For 
the increase in demand, a larger positive  'gap'   is created indicating 
the presence of excess demand.    Under the tariff, adjustment to the 
•gap'   is an expansion of imports from Q1Q3 to QjQg.    The social  cost 
DMN represents the loss of consumption resulting from the tariff-ridden 
price level.    Although it shifts with the demand curve, it remains 
equal  to the social  benefit C'CK.    The redistribution effect C'P^C 
is not affected by the shift, while the revenue effect increases to 
DC'KM due to the expansion of imports.    Because tariffs adjust to 
increased demand by expanding imports and maintaining the price level, 
the net effect of the shift is a larger revenue effect. 
Under 'static equivalent'  quota B'C  the effect of an ex post 
shift in demand is an expansion of production and contraction of 
consumption to fill  the 'gap'  created by increased demand.    The 
adjustment to a shift in demand with the  'maximum'  level of imports 
determined a priori  by the quota is a price increase which expands 
domestic production and simultaneously contracts consumption.    With 
the import level  held constant, a price increase of P^ is necessary 
to expand production to 0Q2 and reduce consumption to 0Q4-    The price 
increase acts to increase production and decrease consumption until 
the 'gap'  created by the shift has decreased to the quantity of imports 
stipulated by the quota.    Although demand has increased, we find 
consumption and imports remain constant at 0Q4 and B»C" respectively 
under the quota.    In comparison to the tariff we find the social  cost 
B"BN and social  benefit C'CJ are larger.    The redistribution effect 
G"PJ>TC represents a greater transfer of consumer's to producer's 
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surplus or increased  'rents' accruing to producers than under the tariff. 
Due to the greater price fluctuation  'quota profits' B"C"JB are larger 
than the revenue effect.    The quota causes greater distortion from free 
trade equilibria because the fixed import level  requires greater 
compensating changes in production, consumption, and price in the 
domestic market.    As a consequence of the extent price changes under 
the quota, producers are made better off while consumers are made worse 
off.    To continue the investigation of the adjustment process in the 
'tightening'  market,  let us look at the effects of a decrease in 
domestic supply. 
(2)     'Tightening.'  Market Resulting from Decreased Supply 
In Figure 4 the free trade price level  is P] with consumption 
0Qfi which is composed of production level 0Q2 and imports Q2Q6- 
a Q   Q a Q3 Q2 a, Q0 
Figure 4:     'Tightening' Market Resulting from Decreased Supply 
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With the imposition of tariff OPp/OP,  or 'static equivalent' quota B'C 
the price increases to P?.    The increase in price causes a subsequent 
increase in production to 0Q3 and decrease in consumption to 0Q5.    Due 
to our assumption of mirror-image supply and demand curves, the absolute 
value of social  benefit C'CJ equals social cost B'GB.    The 'rents' 
accruing to producers resulting from the price increase is represented 
by the redistribution effect C'PaPjC.    The revenue effect and 'quota 
profits' are B'CJG.    Now let us consider the effect of shift in domestic 
supply. 
Assume domestic supply decreases by the amount of the quota as 
indicated by a backward shift to Sd'.    Under the tariff, domestic 
consumption and prices remain constant.    The adjustment to the decrease 
in supply is made solely by an expansion of the import level from B'C 
to B'D.    The social benefit DHK is shifted backward with the supply 
curve but does not change in size.    Social  cost B'GB is unchanged and 
equal   in absolute value to social  benefit DHK.    The shift reduces the 
size of the redistribution effect to DP^H and indicates a loss of 
'rents'  to existing producers.    The expansion of imports increases the 
revenue effect by C'DKJ to B'DKG.    The net effect of an ex post decrease 
in supply is an expansion of imports to fill  the  'gap'  created by the 
decrease in domestic supply, an enlargement of the revenue effect, and 
reduction in  'rents'  to existing producers.    Now let us compare the 
effects under the quota. 
Under quota B'C, we find the adjustment mechanism results in 
different equilibria.    Although the domestic supply decreases, the 
equilibrium level  of production under the quota remains unchanged at 
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0Q?.    With the import level  frozen at B'C  by the quota, a price increase 
of P2P3 is necessary to close the  'gap'  created by the decrease in supply. 
The price increase acts to simultaneously increase production and decrease 
consumption.    As in the case of an increase in demand, we see the price 
increase creates equal social benefit C"HC and social  cost B"MB.    These 
are larger than their tariff counterparts.     'Quota profits' B"C"CM is 
also larger than the revenue effect due to the larger price change.    We 
also find the redistribution effect C'P^H is larger, thus indicating 
larger 'rents'  under the quota.    Because  'quota profits'  and  'rents' 
are significantly larger we conclude producers are made better off 
while consumers are made worse off under the quota. 
Conclusion:     'Tightening' Market 
The adjustment to increased demand or decreased domestic 
production in the  'tightening' market has been demonstrated.    Under 
the tariff,  the adjustment is in the quantity imported with prices held 
constant, while under a quota the constant import level  allows only 
price-induced adjustments in the levels of domestic production and 
consumption.    In the  'tightening'  market the quota magnifies the price 
increase because, in effect, the quota becomes a  'maximum'  import 
restriction causing excess demand and upward price pressure.    The 
excess demand and concomitant price increase draw marginal producers 
into the market while excluding marginal consumers. 
We expect consumers in the importing country to prefer the 
tariff while producers would prefer the quota.    Consumers are better 
off under the tariff because the price level  is maintained with con- 
sumption increasing by the full  amount of the shift in demand and 
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remaining constant for the decrease in supply.    Quotas, on the other hand, 
prevent the full  expansion of consumption by maintaining the import level 
and causing price-induced expansions of production and contractions of 
consumption.    Quotas make producers better off because the rising price 
level  increases both the quantity and value of protection and generates 
larger  'rents'.    Because quotas make producers better off, they are more 
protective, although the tariff is obviously less distortionary with 
respect to the extent of price, consumption, and production changes, it 
does not provide the same degree of protection as the quota. 
The effect of a  'tightening' market in the importing country is 
opposite to what happens in the exporting country.    Since our model  is 
based on the assumption that foreign supply is unresponsive to price, 
the adjustment to changing export demand is in the quantity consumed. 
With supply constant and an increase in export demand, a price adjustment 
is necessary to reduce consumption to close the  'gap'  between what is 
produced and what may be exported.    Under a tariff the adjustment to 
increased export demand E"F" is a price increase of Py'-,  which is 
necessary to decrease consumption by Q'.^V    With a quota the 
exporting country is completely insulated from changes in the importing 
country because the adjustment to  'tightening'  domestic market conditions 
in the importing country take the form of a price increase to draw 
marginal producers into the market and exclude marginal consumers. 
The tariff, on the other hand, maintains prices in the importing country 
and makes the adjustment by expanding imports.    In the 'tightening' 
market consumers in the exporting country would prefer the insulation 
of the quota while producers would prefer the price rise associated with 
tariffs.    As previously stated, the two systems have opposite effects in 
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the import and export country the system causing the greatest distortion 
in one market causing no change in the other. 
B.     'Softening' Market 
In  'softening' markets we know price decreases result from 
decreases in demand or increases in supply and may be shown by downward 
shifts in supply and demand curves.    The initial  equilibrium levels of 
price, consumption, production, and imports in Figure 5 are identical 
to Figure 3.    See the introductory paragraph for subtopic A on (pages 
26-27)  for the discussion of initial  free trade and  'static equivalent' 
Q4°3    S0!^ 
Figure 5:     'Softening' Market Resulting from Decreased Demand 
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tariff and quota equilibria.    We will  first consider the effect of a 
decrease in demand resulting after the imposition of protection. 
(1)     'Softening'  Market Resulting from Decreased Demand 
In Figure 5 we assume domestic demand decreases by the amount 
of the quota to D.'.    Under tariff OP^OP-j  the level of domestic 
consumption decreases by the full amount of the shift.    Prices and 
production are unaffected by the shift.    In the  'softening' market a 
negative  'gap'   is generated which, due to the constant price, may be 
closed only by reducing imports.    With the shift equal to the import 
level  B'C'  the tariff becomes totally prohibitive and imports are 
squeezed to zero.    Since there are no imports the revenue effect is 
zero.    The redistribution effect is unchanged at C'P^C.    The tariff 
adjusts to the decrease in domestic demand through the import level, 
leaving production, consumption, and prices unaffected.    The foreign 
market absorbs the full  impact of the decrease in demand. 
Different equilibria are achieved under quota B'C  because the 
adjustment is in price and not in the quantity imported.     In this case 
the quota becomes a  'minimum'  restriction, which produces an oversupply 
situation.    The excess supply acts as a wedge pushing prices down until 
an equilibrium is reached where domestic supply plus the quota equals 
demand.    Under the strict assumption of this model the quota pushes 
prices down to equilibrium level  P,  and removes the effects from 
protection.    In this particular case by definition we have no social 
cost, social  benefit, redistribution effect, or  'quota profits'  to 
compare with the tariff.    Admittedly, the chance of this happening in 
the real world is rare, but it does demonstrate the fact that in a 
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'softening' market the producer may be adversely affected by the a priori 
determination of foreign supply.    Producers would be better off under the 
tariff due to the insulation from price fluctuations while consumers would 
be better off under the quota due to the increased consumption resulting 
from the lower price. 
(2)    'Softening'  Market Resulting from Increased Supply 
The initial  free trade and static equivalent tariff and  'static- 
equivalent'  quota equilibria in Figure 6 are identical  to those of 
Figure 4.    Refer to the discussion of initial equilibria on page 33. 
PA 
Q ^SSS 
Figure 6:    'Softening'  Market Resulting from Increased Supply 
Q 
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Assuming the supply increases or shifts out by the import level  B'C' we 
find the outcome similar to the increase in demand although having 
different causes.    Under a tariff the price remains constant at P~ thus 
allowing an increase in production by the full  amount of the shift.    The 
adjustment to the shift is made by squeezing imports to zero.    The revenue 
effect also goes to zero.    Social  benefit B'MG is shifted with the supply 
curve and remains equal to social  cost C'CJ.    The redistribution effect 
C'P?P,C increases to B'P?P,M representing larger 'rents'  for existing 
producers.    The net effect under the tariff is a decrease in imports and 
an increase in   'rents'. 
Under the quota B'C  the adjustment is made by a price decrease of 
P?P,   and production increasing by less than the full amount of the shift. 
The adjustment to the increased supply is a price-induced expansion of 
consumption and contraction of production which creates the  'gap'  between 
supply and demand for the quota.    As in the case of a decrease in demand, 
we find the adjustment under the quota results in a movement back to the 
initial  price level  and therefore no effects to compare with the tariff. 
Under the severe restrictions of this model we conclude the quota is 
non-distortionary with respect to the free trade equilibria. 
Conclusion:     'Softening'  Market 
The adjustment to increased supply or decreased demand has been 
demonstrated to take different forms under tariffs and quotas.    Under 
the tariff, the adjustment is in the quantity imported with prices 
constant while the quota maintains constant imports and results in 
price-induced changes in domestic production and consumption.    In the 
•softening' market the quota causes a price decrease which increases 
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consumption and simultaneously decreases production in order to create 
the 'gap'  between production and consumption which is required by the 
quota. 
Consumers in the import country are better off under the quota 
while producers are better off under the tariff.    Consumers are better 
off under the quota because the adjustment to 'softening' market 
conditions takes place in price-induced increases in consumption. 
Tariffs, on the other hand, maintain the existing price level  and make 
the adjustment to shifting market conditions by varying the import level. 
In  'softening'  markets producers benefit from the insulation from market 
conditions inherent to the use of quotas. 
In the exporting country  'static equivalent'  tariffs and quotas 
cause identical  initial responses.    With the introduction of 'softening' 
market conditions  in the importing country differences with respect to 
the dynamic equilibria are generated under each form of protection. 
Under the tariff, the price level  in the exporting country decreases 
due to excess supply resulting from the decreased demand for exports. 
In our highly restrictive model  the tariff reduces trade to zero, results 
in a price decrease to P'.,  and a concomitant increase in consumption to 
0Q'2.    Under the quota, prices and consumption are unaffected due to 
insulation from changing export demand.    Consumers in the exporting 
country would prefer the increased consumption resulting from the price 
decrease under the tariff while producers would be better off under the 
quota because it insulates them from the changing market conditions in 
the importing country and maintains the value of production.    Conditions 
in the exporting country are opposite to those in the importing country. 
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In the importing country consumers are better off under the price decrease 
and concomitant increase in consumption under the quota while producers 
are better off under the tariff due to the price stability.    As in the 
'tightening' market we found the two systems produce opposite effects in 
the import and export countries with the least distortion in one country 
resulting in the greatest distortion in the other. 
Conclusion:    Case I 
In the 'tightening'  market we found tariffs maintained prices and 
allowed maximum consumption while quotas magnify the price increases and 
prevent maximum levels of consumption.    Consumers are better off under the 
tariffs because price stability allowed consumption to increase by the 
full  amount of the increase in demand and maintained the level  of con- 
sumption despite the decrease in domestic production.    Adjustment under 
the quota required a price increase in order to increase p-oduction to 
fill  the  'gap'  created by increased demand or decreased supply.    In the 
'tightening'  market, quotas become the 'maximum'  import level  and cause 
price increases to draw marginal  producers into the market while excluding 
marginal  consumers.    Producers are better off under quotas because the 
price adjustment increases the value of production and generates greater 
'rents'.    With respect to the extent of price, consumption, and production 
changes, the tariff is less distortionary in the import country and there- 
fore, less protective than quotas. 
In the 'softening1 market the quota caused a price decrease which 
resulted from an excess supply situation.    The quota acts as a  'minimum' 
import level which made domestic production plus the quota greater than 
demand.    With the import level determined a priori, a price decrease was 
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necessary to simultaneously decrease production and increase demand to 
create the  'gap'  between production and demand equal  to the quota.    Under 
the highly restrictive assumptions of our model  the system was brought 
back to the initial  free trade price level in the import country. 
Consumers benefit from the price decrease and concomitant increase in 
consumption.    Tariffs, on the other hand, maintain prices and adjust by 
changing the import level.    In the  'softening' market producers are 
better off under the quota due to the insulation from price decreases 
reducing both the quantity and value of production.    The quota magnifies 
the effect of price changes in both dynamic markets, and makes producers 
better off in  'tightening' markets and consumers better off in 'softening' 
markets.     In effect the adjustment mechanism of tariffs provides 
insulation from domestic price changes, making consumers better off in 
'tightening'  markets and producers in  'softening' markets. 
Case II:    Inelastic Demand and Elastic Supply 
The two-country model with inelastic demand and elastic supply is 
the domestic market structure in which tariffs have been considered most 
effective.    This case differs    from Case I in that demand is completely 
unresponsive to price changes.    By definition we know there is no social 
cost in terms of lost consumption from price increases and no social 
benefit or increased consumption from price decreases in this market 
structure.    To simplify the geometry and provide a workable model we will 
set shifts in supply and demand equal  to the import level  under 'static 
equivalent'  tariffs and quotas.    By comparison to Case I we will  develop 
the criteria under which tariffs and quotas achieve maximum usefulness 
and determine the validity of historical usage. 
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A.     'Tightening'  Market 
In Figure 7, the free trade level  of prices is P] with production 
OQ .    The level  of domestic consumption 00- is the sum of domestic 
production and imports QQ*.   The imposition of tariff 0P2/0P1 or static 
equivalent B'C  causes an increase in price to P2 with concomitant 
expansion of production to 0Qr    Imports decrease to Qfy 
witn n0 effect 
P . 
Figure 7:     'Tightening'  Market Resulting from Increased Demand 
on consumption due to the inelasticity of demand.    The protective effect 
or social benefit C'CD is not offset by the consumption effect or social 
cost because there is no loss of consumption resulting from price changes. 
Protection produces a redistribution effect C'P^C representing the 
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'rents'  accruing to producers.    The revenue effect and  'quota profits'  is 
represented by area B'C'DB.    The net effect of the restriction of trade 
is an increase in prices, production, and 'rents'.    Having set up the 
static model   let us proceed to a dynamic analysis of the effects of a 
shift in demand. 
(1)     'Tightening'  Market Resulting from Increased Demand 
We assume domestic demand increases by B'C  the quantity imported 
under restricted trade.    The shift creates a positive 'gap'  between 
domestic production and consumption.    This excess demand situation 
exerts upward pressure on prices.    With tariff 0P2/0P1 the excess 
demand is abated by an expansion of imports by Q2Q3 to Qfly    Under the 
tariff prices and domestic production are constant with consumption 
increasing by the full amount of the shift to OQ3.    Social benefit C'CD 
and the redistribution effect C'P^C are also unaffected by the shift. 
The expansion of imports increases the revenue effect to HC'DG.    Because 
tariffs adjust to increased demand by expanding imports and maintaining 
the price level, the net effect of the shift is a larger revenue effect 
and an increase in consumption by the full  amount of the increase in 
demand. 
Under static equivalent quota B'C  the effect of a shift in demand 
with imports held constant and inelastic demand is an expansion of 
production to fill  the 'gap'  created by the increase in demand.    With 
the  'maximum'   level  of imports determined a priori  by the quota, 
adjustment takes the form of a price increase which draws marginal 
producers into the market.    Social  benefit C'CD is larger than C'CD under 
the tariff and the redistribution effect C^C is also greater.    We 
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also find an increase in the size of 'quota profits'  to B"C"BG.    By placing 
an absolute limitation on the level  of imports, the quota magnifies the 
effect of protection and causes greater compensating changes in the domestic 
market.    Although the quota is more protective than the tariff, it is also 
more distortionary.    To continue the comparison of tariffs and quotas in 
the  'tightening' market, let us look at the effects of a decrease in 
domestic production. 
(2)        'Tightening'  Market Resulting from Decreased Domestic Production 
In  Figure 8, the free trade price level is P] with consumption 0Q3 
which is composed of production level 0Q-,  and imports Q^.    The 
Figure 8:      'Tightening' Market Resulting from 
Decreased Domestic Supply 
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imposition of  'static equivalent' tariff 0P2/0P1 or quota B'C  increases 
the price level to P2-   The increase in price causes an expansion of 
production to 0Q2-    Due to inelastic demand there is no social cost or 
loss of consumption resulting from the price increase.    The  'rents' 
accruing to existing producers is indicated by the redistribution effect 
C'PJ'-iC.    The revenue effect and 'quota profits'  are B'C'DB. 
We now assume supply decreases by the import level B'C.    The 
decrease in production creates a positive 'gap'  between demand and 
production which indicates the presence of excess demand.    Under the 
tariff OPp/OP, the level of domestic consumption and prices remain 
constant.    The adjustment to the decrease in supply is made by expanding 
imports from B'C  to B'H.    Social benefit HKJ shifts with the supply 
curve Sd, but does not change in size.    The size of the  'rents'  HP^K is 
reduced while the revenue effect increases by C'HJD to B'HJB due to the 
expansion of imports.    Under the tariff the net effect of the decrease 
in production is an increase in imports, a larger revenue effect, and 
smaller redistribution effect. 
Under quota B'C, with imports frozen, a price increase P/3 is 
necessary to increase production back to 0Q2 in order to close the  'gap' 
created by the decrease in supply.    Although domestic production decreases 
by the amount of the quota, in our model the equilibrium level of production 
remains unchanged at 0Q2-    The size of the redistribution effect increases 
to CP3P2H due to the price increase.    Thus, the net effect under the 
.. 4. thP size of 'quota profits', social  benefit, and quota is an increase in the size or   nuuwa v 
'rents'. 
rnnrlusinn-     'Tiahtening' Market 
,",9 J 7 and 8 we have Mrt*M the differing adjusts 
mechan,s» of tariffs and ,uota5.   Adjusts under the tariff 1. <. the 
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quantity imported with prices constant, while under the quota the import 
level  is held constant and a price adjustment takes place.    In effect the 
quota becomes  a  'maximum'  import restriction which causes excess demand. 
The upward pressure on prices exerted by the excess demand draws 
marginal  producers  into the market.    The price rise is greater than in 
Case I due to the unresponsiveness of demand to price changes.    The 
tariff allows the shift to become effective and places the burden of 
adjustment on the foreign producers. 
Consumers in the importing country are better off under the 
tariff although they have the same level of consumption under both 
systems.    Consumers are better off under the tariff because the price 
level  is  lower than under the quota.    The quota provides greater 
protection for producers due to the price increase which expands 
production and increases   'rents'.    The greater protection afforded 
by the quota contradicts the validity of historical  reliance on tariffs 
in cases of inelastic demand. 
The effect of 'tightening' markets in the importing country is 
opposite to what happens in the exporting country.    As in Case I, the 
most distortionary means of protection in the one country produces the 
least distortion in the other country.    In the importing country tariffs 
maintain the price level  and have smaller effects on trade than the quota. 
In the exporting country tariffs create excess export demand, which 
raises prices and decreases consumption.    Quotas, on the other hand, are 
more distortionary in the importing country while completely insulating 
the exporting country from shifting. 
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B.     'Softening'  Market 
In  'softening' markets price decreases may result from decreases 
in demand and increases in supply.    The initial equilibrium levels of 
price, consumption, production, and imports of Figures 9 and 10 are 
identical  to Figures 7 and 8 respectively.    See the introductory 
paragraph for Subtopic A, Section One, Case II  (page 40)  for the 
discussion of initial  free trade and tariff and  'static equivalent' 
quota equilibria for Figure 9.    We first consider the market reaction 
to a decrease in demand. 
(1)     'Softening'  Market Resulting from Decreased Demand 
In Figure 9 we will  assume domestic demand decreases by the 
amount of the import level  to Dd'.    Under tariff OP^OP,  (Figure 9) 
Figure 9: Softening'  Market Resulting from Decreased Demand 
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the level of consumption contracts by the full  amount of the shift.    In 
the 'softening' market a negative 'gap'  between demand and domestic 
production is generated which, due to the constant price, may be closed 
only by reducing imports.    The tariff becomes totally prohibitive and 
squeezes imports to zero while maintaining domestic price and production 
levels.    Since there are no imports, the revenue effect is zero.    The 
redistribution effect is unchanged at C'P^C with the full  impact of 
the decrease in domestic demand transmitted to the exporting country. 
In this case quota B'C  becomes a  'minimum'  restriction producing 
an excess supply situation.    The excess supply causes downward pressure 
on prices until the level of prices is reached where the level  of 
domestic production plus the quota equals demand.    In this case price 
falls to P   which is below the initial  free trade equilibrium and 
produces negative effects on trade.    The direction of the redistribution 
effect is reversed, thus representing a transfer of producer's surplus 
to consumer's surplus and a loss of 'rents'  for producers.    By our 
definition of social  cost and social  benefit we know with demand 
unresponsive to price, the net effect of a price decrease is a loss of 
production as represented by C'C'B".    In the  'softening' market the 
tariff makes producers better off and is therefore more protective than 
the quota.    Assuming consumers prefer lower prices, they are better off 
under the quota although the level of consumption is unaffected by either 
method of protection. 
(2)    'Softening' Market Resulting from Increased Domestic Production 
The initial  free trade and static equivalent tariff and quota 
equilibria in Figure 10 are identical  to those of Figure 8.    See 
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Subtopic A, Section 2 (page 42) for the discussion of equilibria in 
Figure 8.    Assuming the domestic supply curve shifts out by the import 
Figure 10:     'Softening' Market Resulting from 
Increased Domestic Supply 
level  B'C  we find the outcome is similar to the increase in demand. 
Under the tariff, the price level  remains constant at P2 and 
production expands by the full amount of the shift.    The adjustment to 
the shift is made by squeezing imports from B'C  to zero.    The revenue 
effect becomes zero while the social  benefit C'CD is shifted with S&>  and 
becomes B'GB.    The redistribution effect C'P^C is expanded to B'P^G 
due to the shift.    The net effect under the tariff is a decrease in imports, 
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an Increase in  'rents', a zero revenue effect, and full  expansion of 
production by the amount of the shift. 
Under the quota B'C, the adjustment is made by a price decrease 
from Pp to P  .    The shift in domestic production does not become effective 
due to the excess supply situation resulting from the quota.    A price 
decrease is necessary to exclude marginal  producers to expand the  'gap' 
to fit the quota.    Production remains constant although at ?2 domestic 
supply is shifted by Q2Q3.    In this case the adjustment process reduces 
prices below initial  free trade price level  P-,  and leaves consumption 
unaffected.    The net effect of the price-induced contraction of supply 
and the quota is a redistribution effect B'P^C" in favor of consumers, 
and a  'quota loss'. 
Conclusion:     'Softening' Market 
In  'softening' markets tariffs maintain the price level  and adjust 
the quantity imported while quotas maintain constant at import level  and 
reduce domestic production by price changes.    In Case II the quota causes 
greater compensating price changes than in Case I due to the unresponsive- 
ness of demand to price changes.    With inelastic demand and elastic supply, 
adjustments are permitted only with respect to the level of domestic 
production.    The extent of price changes under the quota depends on the 
elasticity of supply with less elastic curves requiring larger price 
changes while smaller compensating changes are associated with greater 
elasticity.    Although consumption is not affected by either method, due 
to the lower prices the consumers are better off under the quota.    Tariffs 
are more protective because they maintain price and allow the full 
n     c-  ^B„c in 'softening' markets are in agreement expansion of supply.    Our findings in   sottem g 
.,■    *^« r>f tariffs in cases of inelastic demand, 
with the historical justification of tarirrs 
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In the exporting country the adjustment to decreased export demand 
under the tariff is a price decrease to P'1.    The decrease in price is 
caused by excess supply resulting from the decreased export demand.    In 
our highly restrictive model the adjustment to  'softening' market 
conditions reduces trade to zero.    The net effect is increased consumption 
at lower prices for consumers and less  'rents'  for producers.    The quota 
guarantees a share of the domestic market to the exporting country and 
therefore insulates them from changes.    In this case producers in the 
exporting country receive greater protection from the quota due to the 
constant production and price stability. 
Conclusion:    Case II 
In 'tightening' markets we found tariffs maintained prices and 
allowed the market shifts to become effective while quotas magnified 
the increase in prices and maintained or increased production. It was 
demonstrated that quotas become a 'maximum' import restriction, which 
creates excess demand. The excess demand causes a rising price level 
until enough marginal producers have been drawn into the market. The 
price rise is greater than in Case I due to the unresponsiveness of demand 
to price changes. 
As in Case I, we expect the consumers to prefer the constant 
prices under the tariff, although consumption was unaffected by either 
system.    Quotas make producers better off because the price increases 
expand production and increase 'rents'.    Thus, in 'tightening' markets 
quotas are more protective than tariffs due to the increase in the 
quantity and value of production.    This is contradictory to the 
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historical  justification of tariffs in cases of inelastic demand.    Tariffs 
are, however,  less distortionary. 
In the  'softening' market tariffs are less distortionary and more 
protective than quotas.    With imports determined a priori the quota 
becomes a wedge exerting downward pressure on prices to create a  'gap' 
the size of the quota.    Quotas result in a price decrease below the 
initial  free trade equilibrium.    In the 'softening' market the tariff 
provides greater protection for producers by insulating them from price 
changes which reduce the quantity and value of production.    Thus, in 
Case II the use of tariffs in  'softening' markets is valid. 
In the exporting country tariffs are more distortionary in 
'tightening'  markets while quotas are more distortionary in the 
importing country.    Tariffs result in increased demand for exports, 
which pushes up prices and excludes marginal consumers.    Producers in 
the exporting country are better off under tariffs due to the increased 
'rents'  while consumers would prefer the insulation from price increases. 
Conclusion:    Chapter Two 
In Chapter Two we have demonstrated the dynamic non-equivalence 
of tariffs and quotas resulting from the different adjustment mechanisms: 
tariffs places the burden of adjustment on the exporting country while 
quotas leave the adjustment to domestic producers and consumers.    We also 
demonstrated that changes in domestic prices and prices in the export 
country depend on the elasticity of supply and demand.    The quota was 
shown to provide greater protection in the  'tightening' market due to 
the magnification of price changes which increase both the value and 
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quantity produced.    This was especially true in Case II because price 
increases had no social cost in terms of lost consumption and caused 
greater expansions of production.    Our findings in the  'tightening1 
market contradict the conventional justification of tariffs in markets 
with inelastic demand. 
In the  'softening' market tariffs were shown to make producers 
better off.    Adjustment under the tariff is an expansion or contraction 
of imports to fill  the  'gap'  between domestic production and demand.    In 
our model  the tariff becomes totally prohibitive in the face of increases 
in supply and decreases in demand.    Producers were not as well  off under 
quotas due to the price decrease which reduced both the value and 
quantity produced.    Thus we have shown the historical reliance on tariffs 
in markets with inelastic demand is justified only in the 'softening- 
market, while quotas are more protective in 'tightening'  markets. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
The purposes of the general equilibrium chapter are to show, first, 
that quotas establish a market relationship fundamentally different from 
that which underlies the conventional tariff; second, that in a 
comparative static context, tariffs and quotas may be used to generate 
identical  results; third, that in a dynamic contest, the 'equivalence' 
breaks down.    To distinguish the two systems as simply as possible, we 
will  approach the question as a general  equilibrium problem of exchange 
between two groups entering the market with fixed endowments of two 
goods.    General  equilibrium analysis is used due to our concern with 
the interrelationships of decision-making units and commodity markets. 
In the pure exchange model we exclude production in order to isolate 
the factors giving rise to trade and consumption.    The pure exchange 
model  permits a clear picture of market relationships and consumer 
reactions to changes in income distribution and prices without 
distorting the central theoretical  issues involved.    The use of the 
Edgeworth box analysis enables us to investigate the Pareto-optimality 
of income distributions resulting from protection.    In Section One we 
will  consider three static cases:    competitive equilibrium,  'static 
equivalent'  tariffs and quotas, and the all-or-nothing quota.    In 
Section Two we extend the analysis to a dynamic context and demonstrate 
how the different adjustment mechanisms may be used for maximum 
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exploitation by the imposers.    We begin the general  equilibrium analysis 
by setting up the basic model and defining the competitive case. 
Section One:    Static General  Equilibrium Analysis 
The model  is based on the following assumptions: 
1. Two  'goods'  X and Y are traded. 
2. Trade takes place between two countries A and B. 
3. Countries A and B are composed of identical  individuals with respective 
utility functions: 
Ua -  f(X - Xb. Y  - Yb) 
Ub =  f(Xb, Yb) 
4. The A's and B's operate in a perfectly competitive world. 
5. The A's and B's are rational  consumers. 
6. The indifference curves of both traders are homothetic. 
The assumption that X and Y are  'goods' means there is a direct 
relationship between endowments and welfare.    Increased endowments result 
in movement to higher utility levels while decreased endowments reduce 
welfare.    We also know each country is composed of individuals with 
identical  tastes, preferences, and resource endowments.    Because each 
individual   in A or B has the same income and consumes the same bundle of 
X and Y, we can represent the position of the country by the position of 
any one individual.    The assumptions of perfect competition and rationality 
tell  us the individuals are incapable of affecting prices and choose 
allocations providing the highest utility level.    Rational behavior 
implies that each trader attempts to move to the highest utility level 
consistent with the preference map of his adversary.    This in turn Implies 
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that individual utility maximization is consistent with minimization of 
the adversary's utility.    The homotheticity assumption will be important 
in the dynamic analysis.    By definition we know a ray from the origin 
will  intersect all  homothetic indifference curves at the same angle. 
This is not the same as vertically parallel  indifference curves which 
arise by assuming constant marginal utility of income.    Having described 
the basic model we now move to the competitive case. 
Case One:    Competitive Equilibrium 
In Figure 11 the initial  equilibrium is located at point P. 
The B's are on B„ with income Y], X4, while the A's are located on A? 
*x 
igure 
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with Y - Y,,  X - X..    The ellipse PJ forms the relevant area within which 
trade is possible.    Trade is restricted within this area because the A's 
will prefer the income distribution in the absence of trade at point P 
on initial  indifference curve A? over distributions, placing them on 
lower indifference curves.    Likewise, the B's will not accept trades 
moving them to indifference curves below their initial  utility level  Bg. 
The initial  income distribution at point P and the fact that this is an 
intersection and not a point of tangency determines both the commodities 
which will  be traded and the willingness to trade.    Although the analysis 
is not dependent upon this, we will mention that indifference curves 
generated by utility function Ui • f(X,Y) where i = a,b will  have the 
slope 
3U 14 
3X _      MUx = mc xv 
■ 3U " " MW y 
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According to Friedman, selecting any function of U* where U* = G(U(X,Y)) 
will have a slope of 
dU* 
ffl   MUx .      MUx 
dU* MUy      " MUy  ' 
dU 
From this we conclude that all utility functions will have the same 
indifference curves and will hold even if   §* < 0.    The condition that 
JP > 0    is necessary to guarantee that the ordering is in the same 
dll 
direction. 
Friedman, Milton, Pric^or^^^ Chicago: 
Aldine Press, 1971, p. 46. 
15Ibid.  p. 46. 
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At point P the marginal rate of substitution of X for Y (MRS xy)  is 
different for the A's and B's as indicated by the differing slopes of 
NN' and KK'.    Because the slope of NN'  is greater than KK' we know the 
A's have a higher MRS xy than the B's.    This means that in comparison 
with the B's, the A's are willing to give up proportionately more Y for 
additional  units of X.    The relatively less steep slope of KK'  reflects 
a lower MRS xy for the B's and indicates their willingness to give up 
proportionately greater quantities of X for additional units of Y.    From 
the initial  endowment point and the differing MRS xy we conclude the A's 
will  trade for X and supply V while the B's will  supply X and trade for 
Y.    Since the slopes of the indifference curves of the A's and B's differ, 
the marginal  conditions for exchange are not satisfied, the income 
distribution is non-Pareto optimal, and trade is possible.    Having 
described the model,  let us discuss the method by which free trade leads 
to a Pareto-optimal   income distribution. 
In our model we make use of the Walrasian umpire.    According to 
Friedman, the Walrasian method is a useful  concept to bring out the 
•logic of the interrelation of the price system'  but cannot be used to 
analyze a concrete problem.16   The use of the Walrasian umpire results in 
a determinant solution because a market clearing price must be found before 
trade is allowed to take place.    The umpire begins by calling different 
relative prices  (Px/Py), denoted in Figure 11 by PPn where n = 1   ...  n. 
Traders are allowed to select optimum or preferred quantities at each 
relative price.    Optimal positions are determined by points of tangency 
16 Ibid.  p.  27. 
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of indifference curves and price vectors.    The collection of these optima 
form the price-offer locus.    Along the price-offer loci the following 
relationship holds for each trader: 
MRS xv = . MUx = . I!*. = PP mb xy MUy py     KKn 
POa is the locus of such points for the A's with POb the equivalent locus 
for the B's.    Because points along the price-offer loci represent optimal 
allocations, they will  be chosen over non-optimal points located off the 
curve.    Trade is possible only at the market clearing price, determined 
by the intersection of POa and POb.    At prices other than the market 
clearing price, the indifference curves of the two traders are tangent 
to the same price vector but not tangent to each other, and excess supply 
or demand conditions are present.    When excess supply is present the 
umpire is prompted to lower the price, while excess demand is a signal 
to raise prices.    Excess demand is indicated in Figure 12.    At PP2 the 
Figure 12:    Excess Demand 
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A's demand quantity X,  as indicated by the tangency of A,p to the price 
vector.    At this price the B's are willing to supply only quantity X-. 
The presence of excess demand prompts the umpire to call  a higher price. 
The umpire submits higher prices until the market clearing price PP. is 
found.    Once the indifference curves of both traders are tangent to each 
other at point F, the umpire allows the quantities of X and Y determined 
by the intersection of POa and POb to be exchanged at the price indicated 
by the slope of the tangency.    At point F the marginal conditions for 
exchange are satisfied, and the following relationship holds: 
MRS xy (A's)  = MRS xy (B's) = PP4- 
The satisfaction of the marginal  conditions precludes further trade, makes 
F a point on the contract locus AFB, and represents a Pareto-optimal 
income distribution.    We are not permitted to make statements as to what 
may happen after a market-clearing price is reached, since non-quantifiable 
factors such as bargaining strength may become the determining factors. 
We know only that movements in either direction from contract curve AFB 
cause changes in the terms of trade, the distribution of income, and the 
prices confronting each trader.    The price divergence associated with 
points off AFB prevents the attainment of the social optimum and once the 
marginal  conditions for exchange have been satisfied, the system will remain 
at rest until  disturbed. 
We will  now analyze the tariff and  'static equivalent'  quota as 
possible disturbances of market equilibria.    The analysis is then 
extended to the all-or-nothing case in which a combination import- and 
export- quota is used.    The all-or-nothing case is used to expose the 
conditions for maximum exploitation by the B's.    Although in our analyse 
59 
we will confine attention solely to tariffs and quotas, we may also note 
that in a static context a subsidy for consumers may be used to generate 
a market equilibrium identical to the tariff or quota. 
Case Two:    The Tariff and 'Static Equivalent' Quota 
In case two we will alter the assumptions made in the competitive 
case to the extent that: 
1. The B's have perfect knowledge of the preference map of the A's. 
2. The B's are monopolists and are able to control  the terms of trade. 
3. The B's impose a tariff or quota. 
4. Tariff revenue collected by the B's is distributed to individuals 
within the country in the form of a lump-sum subsidy. 
In Figure 13, the ellipse TH forms the boundaries within which 
the B's will  operate.    As utility maximizers the A's will prefer to 
remain at point P rather than accept distributions placing them on 
indifference curves below A?, while the B's will not offer distributions 
placing them on indifference curves below Bg.    As monopolists, the B's 
will use their perfect knowledge of the A's preference map to find the 
maximum exploitable price in the tariff case, and the utility maximizing 
quantity of Y or X to be imported or exported in the quota case. 
Because POa represents the optimum allocations of the A's, the B's 
will select a point on POa which places them on their highest indifference 
curve and therefore leading to maximum utility.    Utility maximization for 
the B's  is attained by imposing a tariff on Y imports.    A tariff set at 
rate X generates the necessary divergence between competitive price PP4 
and PP6 to move equilibrium from point F to T.    The slope of cord TF is 
the change in the competitive price ratio necessary for the movement of 
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equilibrium to point T and is therefore the rate at which the tariff is 
set.    We will  refer to this rate of divergence as X.    At point T the 
slopes of the indifference curves differ by X and the following 
Figure 13:    Tariff and 'Static Equivalent' Quota 
relationship holds: 
MUx 
.&(!*•) +X = PP4 + X = PP6 = MRS xy (A's). 
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The tariff results  in an increased share of world income for the B's while 
the A's share diminishes.    With the imposition of tariff X the B's move 
from Bin to B,. while the A's move from A, 7 to Ag.    The increased welfare 
for the B's results from the relative price (Px/Py) increase and may be 
considered at the expense of the A's who now receive a lower price for Y. 
Now let us extend the analysis to the 'static equivalent' quota. 
To be effective, an import quota must restrict trade to a level 
below that which would occur under competition.    By setting the minimum 
allowable quantity Y,Y. equal to the import level under the tariff, we 
generate quantity Xg consistent with POa and a concomitant market 
clearing price PPg.    A 'static equivalent'  import quota Y^ or export 
quota X2X5 may be used to generate the same income distribution and 
welfare as tariff A. 
From the existence of ellipse TH we know the income distribution 
at point T is non-Pareto optimal.    Since point T is an intersection and 
not a point of tangency the marginal conditions for exchange are not 
satisfied and trade is possible within TH allowing one trader to move to 
a higher utility level without reducing the welfare of the other. 
In a static context tariffs and quotas differ only with respect to 
the way in which the terms of trade are reached.    Under both systems the 
strategy of the B's is the attainment of utility maximizing point T.    In 
the tariff case the price is determined a priori  by creating the divergence 
necessary to move from point F to T.    With a quota it is the level  of Y 
imports which is determined a priori, while the market is allowed to 
generate a set of relative prices consistent with the quantity of X 
preferred by the A's.    Once the quantity of X consistent with POa is 
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determined we also have the market clearing price ratio.    Because the 
marginal conditions of exchange are not satisfied at point T, the out- 
come of both forms of protection is non-Pareto optimal.    The tariff and 
quota have in this  instance been used to produce the same 'static' 
equilibria, thus allowing the description  'static equivalent'.    In case 
three we will  use a combination of quotas to generate a case which is 
not possible using any combination of tariffs. 
Case Three:    The Al1-or-Nothing Quota 
The all-or-nothing quota is shown in Figure 14.    With perfect 
knowledge of the A's preference map the B's are able to drive a harder 
bargain with an import quota setting the minimum quantity Y,Y, and an 
Figure 14:    The All-or-Nothing Quota 
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and an export quota setting the minimum quantity XgX..    The optimal 
restriction for the B's is determined by finding the point on the initial 
indifference curve A? which places the B's on their highest attainable 
indifference curve.    Point M on B17 is the highest attainable utility 
level for the B's.    Now let us discuss the strategy used by the B's. 
The B's  use the utility maximizing behavior of the A's to assure 
a position near the super max point M.    As utility maximizers the A's 
always select points on their highest attainable indifference curve. 
For points along A? the A's are indifferent between initial equilibrium 
at point P and trade at point M.    By altering the quotas to generate a 
point just above point M on Ag at PP?*. just less than PP?, the B's 
assure themselves point M*.    Setting a tariff to generate the divergence 
between free trade price PP4 and PP?* is necessary, but not sufficient, 
to place them at point M*.     If confronted with the tariff-induced price 
PP7, the A's would choose point D on POa, which places them on a higher 
indifference curve than at points P or H.    This follows because points 
on POa represent the locus of preferred positions always chosen over non- 
optimal  points  located off the curve.    Using the tariff to determine the 
relative price ratio Px/Py assures the B's a point on POa, while a prion 
determination of the export and import level enables the B's to select a 
super max point on the initial  indifference curve of the A's.    Then, by 
altering the quotas just enough to confront the A's with a point on Ag, 
the B's are assured of B16.    Simultaneous quotas enable the B's to extract 
the maximum exploitable price for X by altering the quotas just enough to 
ma.e the A's only slightly better off than on their initial  indifference 
curve.    Although a solution identical to the simultaneous quota is possible 
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by using a subsidy-tariff combination, the result is not strictly 
achievable by tariffs alone.    Having demonstrated the general equilibrium 
'static equivalence'  of tariffs and quotas, and the All-or-Nothing case, 
let us define the conditions under which 'equivalence'  breaks down. 
Section Two:    Dynamic General Equilibrium Models 
The purpose of this section is to contrast the behavior of tariffs 
and quotas in a dynamic context.    We will be concerned with two dynamic 
market structures:     'tightening' markets and 'softening' markets.    From 
Chapter I we know  'tightening' markets are characterized by an increasing 
price level  Px/Py, which may result from four sources: 
1. Px may increase given Py is constant. 
2. Py may decrease given Px is constant. 
3. A combination Px increase and Py decrease. 
4. An increase in both Px and Py if the increase in Px is greater than 
the increase in Py. 
'Softening'  markets are characterized by a decreasing price level Px/Py 
which may result from four sources: 
1. Px may decrease given Py is constant. 
2. Py may increase given Px is constant. 
3. A combination Px decrease and Py increase. 
4. A decrease in both Px and Py if the decrease in Px is greater than the 
decrease in Py. 
Aside from changes  in things which are held constant, relative 
prices may fluctuate due to shifting market conditions which change the 
marginal valuations of the goods.    Increased endowments decrease the value 
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at the margin while decreased endowments increase marginal values. 
Although varying, the endowments of either 'good' may be used to achieve 
the same effect on relative prices, for simplicity we will vary only the 
A's endowment of Y since the B's objective as monopolist is securing Y 
at the lowest relative price Px/Py.    Conversely, this may be explained 
as exchanging X at the highest relative price Px/Py, consistent with 
utility maximization and the price-offer locus of the A's.    The locus 
POb is unique to the competitive case and with the introduction of 
monopoly POb becomes the point on the A's price-offer locus at which 
the B's achieve maximum utility.    Furthermore, altering the B's 
endowment would change only the number of the B's utility maximizing 
indifference curve, whereas changing the A's endowment will result in 
a new price-offer locus and a new utility maximizing point for the B's. 
We begin the dynamic analysis by proving that welfare and income vary 
directly. 
In Figure 15, we show that an increased endowment of Y is 
sufficient to move the A's to a higher indifference curve regardless of 
the new equilibrium price vector.    For the A's to be better off it is 
sufficient to show that POa* does not intersect POa, and that any point 
on POa* represents the tangency of higher indifference curves.    From 
f „.:., p   „» increase the endowment of Y initial  income distribution at point P, we mere 
vertical,, by PP-.    The intersection of POa- and POb' determine the new 
Wi,ltri, at point T.    POb' represents the s»e iocos of tan9encies 
« to Drice vectors and differs only with of the B's indifference curves to price vect 
iocos for the A's an, is replaced by POa- which represents the new iocos 
66 
of tangencies of price vectors and higher indifference curves.    At the 
new equilibrium point F, the A's are on A2 which is greater than A,  at 
Y 
Figure 15:    Increased Endowment of Y Increases 
the Welfare of the A's 
point F.    For the A's to be worse off, POa* would have to intersect POb' 
on the segment F'D.    We conclude the A's are better off as a result of 
the increased endowment of Y since POa* does not intersect POa and points 
on POa* represent higher utility levels than POa.    Conversely, it is true 
that a decrease in the endowment of Y leads to a reduction of the A's 
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welfare.    Having demonstrated the A's welfare varies directly with good 
Y, let us proceed to the comparison of trade restrictions. 
Initial  supply and demand conditions in Figures 11 and 13 
determine how market conditions will  affect the welfare of each trader. 
Because the relative price is the ratio Px/Py, an increase in relative 
prices causes a clockwise rotation of the price vector.    For an increase 
in Px a smaller quantity of X will be offered at each quantity of Y, 
thus drawing the vector down and to the left.    For a decrease in Py a 
greater quantity of Y will  be offered for additional units of X, thus 
pushing the price vector down.    A decrease in relative prices rotates 
the price vector counterclockwise.    For a decrease in Px a larger 
quantity of X will  be offered at each quantity of Y, thus pushing the 
vector up and to the right.    An increase in Py causes a reduction in 
the quantity of Y offered at each quantity of X, thus pulling the price 
vector up and to the right. 
We also know that increased welfare for one means the welfare of 
the other is reduced or unaffected.    Because the A's are suppliers of 
Y, their welfare varies directly with Py and inversely with relative 
price ratio Px/Py.    For increases in Py with Px constant the A's offer 
less Y at each optimum or preferred position on the price-offer locus. 
A decrease in the relative price ratio Px/Py causes a counter-clockwise 
rotation of the price vector, which places the A's on a higher 
indifference curve.    The B's welfare is directly related to relate 
prices and Px since they are suppliers of X.    Markets in which the value 
* .* ^t*t^ the price vector clockwise and 
of X increases with Py constant rotates tne pn<. 
u-  h      ^difference curve.    In summary, clockwise moves the B's to a higher indifference curv 
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rotation increases the welfare of the B's while decreasing the welfare 
of the A's.    The A's gain from relative price decreases and lose from 
increases, while the B's gain from relative price increases and lose 
from decreases.    We now extend the analysis from the competitive 
equilibrium to the  'tightening' market. 
Case I:     'Tightening'  Market 
A  'tightening' market is characterized by increasing relative 
prices.    This is achieved analytically by increasing the A's allocation 
of Y by AY1  thus  reducing Py.    In Figure 15 we proved the A's must 
benefit from an increased endowment of Y by vertically shifting the 
price-offer locus of the A's.    In Figure 16 we show the increased 
endowment of Y by shifting the origin of the A's preference map down 
by AY'.    This moves the A's to a higher utility level  Ag.    By assuming 
homothetic indifference curves we know the downward shift of the A's 
origin leads to a different slope of the A's indifference curve at the 
intersection at point P\    The slope of MM'  in Figure 16 is greater 
than the slope of NN'  in Figure 13, thus indicating the willingness of 
the A's to trade greater quantities of Y for additional units of X. 
The offering of greater quantities of V in trade for X reflects the 
decrease in Py.    The change in marginal  valuation generates a new price- 
offer locus POa* which is located to the right and below POa. 
Competitive equilibrium, determined by the intersection of POa* 
and POb, is moved from point F to F'.    The new equilibrium price level 
P'P5 is less than P'P,.    Income distribution for the B's shifts from 
X2, Y2 to X13, Y]2 while the A's have X - %. * ■ tY12 + AY *' 
B's move to a higher utility level B]2 due to the increase in relative 
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prices.    Now let us see what happens if the shift occurs after the 
imposition of protection. 
Y 
adj 
Figure 16:     'Tightening' Market Resulting from 
an  Increased Endowment of Y 
Under tariff A trade is restricted to movements along P'Pg with 
ustments taking place in the quantities traded.    Because trade is 
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restricted to P'Pg, the decrease in Py which increases relative prices 
Px/Py does not become effective.    The tariff equilibrium shifts from 
point T to T'  with the B's trading XgX^  for YgY10 and moving to higher 
utility level  8,5.    The increased welfare for the A's varies inversely 
with relative prices Px/Py, and directly with Py changes.    Second, the 
tariff prevents the Px/Py increase from becoming effective.    By maintain- 
ing the price level  in the face of increasing prices, the tariff prevents 
the B's from benefiting directly while insulating the A's from 'tightening' 
market conditions. 
Under quota Y,Yg the increased endowment of Y shifts the 
equilibrium from point T to Q and results in a higher price P'P?.    The 
relative price increase under the quota is explained by the unique 
adjustment mechanism of the quota.    The decrease in Py results in a 
greater quantity of Y offered for each unit of X or conversely stated, 
less X is required at each optimum position on POa*.    Thus, with the 
quantity of Y fixed by the quota at Vf. the adjustment to the decrease 
in Py takes the form of a decrease in the quantity of X required in trade 
by the A's.    Because less X is required at each optimum point on POa* we 
conclude relative prices have increased and the B's are better off.    The 
increase in Px causes an increase in relative prices Px/Py with a new 
quota equilibrium generated at a higher price P'Py.    The income distribute 
is now X12, Y, for the B's, while the A's have X - !„. » - C«   
+ V' 
Due to the shift and increase in relative prices the B's gain «*, 
without trading additional  Y. 
At point Q the »'. are on . N. indifference curve than at 
due to the decrease in Py and effective increase in reiative prices. 
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Conclusion:     'Tightening' Market Relative Price 
Since the B's welfare varies directly with relative prices Px/Py, 
and inversely with Py, we know that in a  'tightening' market they are 
better off under a quota because the relative price increase becomes 
effective.    In a  'tightening'  market the quota adjustment to the decrease 
in Py takes place in terms of a clockwise rotation of the price vector, 
which increases the B's allocation of X and moves them to a higher 
utility level.    Because both X and Y are 'goods' we know a change in 
relative prices will make one trader better off.    We also know the A's 
welfare undergoes the greatest reduction under the system in which the 
B's gain is greatest.    Now let us contrast the results in 'softening' 
markets. 
Case II:     'Softening' Market 
In  'softening' markets we explain the decrease in relative prices 
by an increase in Py resulting from a reduction of the A's allocation of 
Y.    In this case also we assume the reduction of the total Y endowment 
affects only that portion of Y owned by the A's and has no affect on 
the B's valuation of Y.    Given a constant X endowment, the decrease in 
the Y leads to an increased marginal valuation of V by the A's and a 
concomitant decrease in relative price ratio Px/Py.    In Figure 15 we 
proved that an increased endowment of V makes the A's better off and 
conversely, a decrease in Y makes the A's worse off.    In Figure 17 we 
decrease the A's initial  allocation by AY', shifting the origin of the 
A's upward by the amount of the decrease.    The upward shift of the A's 
origin n»ves the A's to lower indifference curve A3.    Under the assumpt.on 
of homothetic indifference curves the result of the upward shift of the 
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A's origin is  a different slope of the A's indifference curves at the 
intersection of A3 and BQ at point P'.    The differing slopes of NN'  in 
Figure 17:     'Softening' Market Resulting from 
Decreased Y Endowment for the A s 
Figure 13 and LL'   in Figure 17 reflect the higher Py.    The slope of NN'  is 
steeper than LL'  because less Y is offered for each unit of X.    Under 
competition the higher marginal  valuation of Y in Figure 17 indicates the 
A's reluctance to offer the same amount of Y at each price.    A new price- 
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offer locus POa* is located to the left and above the old locus POa. 
Along POa*,  reflecting the higher Py, a smaller quantity of Y is offered 
for each quantity of X.    A new equilibrium point F'  and price level 
p'P    is generated by the intersection of POa* and POb.    The income of 
the B's is now Xg, Y]2 with X - Xg, Y - [Y]2 - AY
1] for the A's.    The 
B's income increases by X^g through trade of Y2Y12.    The slope of cord 
FF'   (not shown) indicates the change in relative prices Px/Py resulting 
from the shift.    At point F'  the B's are made worse off while the A's 
are better off due to the decrease in relative price.    Having demonstrated 
the effect of the shift under competition, let us compare the effect of 
the ex post endowment shift on tariff and quota equilibria. 
Adjustment to the increase in Py and concomitant decrease in 
relative price Px/Py under tariff X is confined to movement along P'Pg 
with equilibrium moving from point T to T'.    Both points T and T'  are 
non-Pareto optimal  because the marginal  conditions are not satisfied 
and trade enables one trader to increase his welfare without decreasing 
the welfare of the other.    As a result of the shift the B's utility 
.aximizing point on POa* is moved from B16 to B]4 and the B's give up 
YgY6 and XgX5.    Under the tariff the B's are made worse off by the 
reduction in the A's endowment of Y and concomitant increase in Py and 
decrease in Px/Py.    The deterioration of the B's welfare under the tariff 
is the result of the movement of POa*. 
The new equilibrium under quota *,¥, becomes point Q on P'P5- 
Because the price P'P5 is less than P'P6 we know the B's are worse off 
under the quota.    The B's are better off under the tariff because the 
'softening'  market is not allowed to become effective.    The existence of 
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the ellipse QR makes the income distribution under the quota non-Pareto 
optimal.    Since the marginal  conditions for exchange are not satisfied 
at points Q or T', trade is possible in X although Y is frozen by the 
quota. 
Conclusion:    Case II 
Because the B's welfare varies directly with relative prices 
Px/Py and inversely with Py, in  'softening' markets the B's attain higher 
utility levels by using the tariff.    The B's are better off under the 
tariff in the  'softening' market due to the insulation from relative 
price decreases.    The tariff prevents the price decrease from becoming 
effective and therefore prevents a welfare loss for the B's.    Quotas, on 
the other hand, allow the decrease in relative prices to become effective 
thus making the A's better off and the B's worse off.    In a  'softening' 
market maximum exploitation is achieved under the tariff. 
Conclusion:    Chapter Three 
With perfect market knowledge and costless adjustment to changing 
.arket conditions by varying quantities and prices instantaneously, we 
have found quotas may be used interchangeably with tariffs to produce 
the same equilibria.    However,  in the absence of such perfect knowledge 
and costless adjustment, the adjustment mechanism of tariff or quota 
systems may be used to generate superior welfare for the imposer.    Due to 
initial market conditions we found the B's welfare to vary directly with 
relative prices Px/Py   and inversely with Py.    In the 'tightening' market 
characterized by increasing relative prices and a clockwise rotate of 
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B's are better off because the quota holds the quantity of Y constant 
permitting only a price adjustment, through changes in the quantity of 
X required on POa*. 
In  'softening'  markets a decrease in relative prices is shown by 
a counter-clockwise rotation of the price vector.    Tariffs make the B's 
better off because the decrease in relative prices is not allowed to 
become effective.    Under the tariff relative prices are held constant and 
the quantity traded is allowed to change in adjustment to the changing 
market conditions.    The B's are made better off under the tariff in the 
'softening'  market because the tariff adjusts through the quantity traded 
and does not allow the decrease in relative prices and the concomitant 
decrease in welfare. 
The results of our analysis may be generalized.    Traders whose 
welfare varies directly with relative prices Px/Py, are better off by 
virtue of the tariff in the  'softening' market and by the quota in the 
'tightening'  market.    They are better off with a tariff in 'softening- 
markets because the decrease in relative prices does not become effective. 
Conversely,  they are better off with a quota in  'tightening' markets 
because the increase in relative prices becomes effective.    Because tariffs 
maintain relative prices, traders are insulated from market shifts.    Quotas, 
on the other hand,  allow the price changes resulting from market shifts 
to become effective.    The adjustment mechanism of the quota would appear 
more like the free market if not for the fact that trade in one comity 
is frozen. 
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Reversing the supply and demand conditions resulting from initial 
endowments would reverse the conclusions.    Because the imposing country 
may lose as well  as gain, it is essential  that it have adequate 
information about both market conditions and trading partners before 
selecting the type of protection to achieve maximum exploitation of 
its rival.    The use of the wrong method may reduce the welfare of the 
imposing country and make its adversary better off. 
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SUMMARY 
In Chapter I we discussed the historical  context in which quotas 
were first used and the reasons why they came into being.    The French 
used import quotas to divert the inelastic supply of Australian wheat 
while recent United States import quotas have been used as a 'stop-gap1 
measure to protect  'mature'  domestic industries threatened by foreign 
competition.    Arguments for the protection by quotas of 'mature' 
industries  are fundamentally different from the  'infant'  industry 
arguments made by supporters of tariffs.    Import quotas were shown to 
be more arbitrary than tariffs due to the administrative flexibility 
which allows a priori  determination of the quantities to be imported 
as well  as those who will  be allowed to import.    The artificial 
stimulation and misallocation of resources resulting from protection 
cause a distortion of social  cost and social  benefit.    In static p.rti.l 
equilibrium analysis, taxes and quantitative restrictions may be used 
to achieve the same results, since both ultimately limit the supply. 
in Chapter II the  'static equivalence'  and dynamic 'non-equivalence 
of tariffs and quotas was demonstrated in a partial equilibrium model. 
Quotas mate producers better off in the 'tightening' mar.et by virtue 
of their adjustment n*chanism.    Producers are better off in the 
,softening.  market under tariffs because the relative pnc. U -M 
while changes take place in the quantities traded.    »»™~ 
characterized by inelastic demand, we found producers were bet 
Under the quota in the  'tightening' market.    This contracts the 
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historical  reliance on tariffs in this market structure.    Tariffs were 
found to provide greater protection in the 'softening' market. 
In Chapter III we used a dynamic general equilibrium model  to 
contrast the two forms of protection.    The importance of initial endow- 
ments in determining the willingness to trade and the equilibrium price 
level was demonstrated.    We found traders whose welfare varies directly 
with relative prices are better off under the tariff in the  'softening' 
market and under the quota in the  'tightening' market.    Tariffs make 
this trader better off in the 'softening' market by preventing the 
decrease in relative prices from becoming effective.    On the other hand, 
quotas make him better off in 'tightening' markets because it allows the 
increase in relative prices to become effective.    The reverse is true 
for traders whose welfare varies inversely with relative prices.    Because 
the imposing country may be adversely affected by shifting market 
conditions,  it is important that adequate knowledge be available 
concerning the trading partner and the market in which he is operating. 
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